incentivizing online content creation is something that very many people care about, and there have been many designs of a similar character, as well as some fairly different designs.
Given that so many mechanisms seem to fail in such similar ways once multiple identities or even liquid markets get into the picture, one might ask, is there some deep common strand that causes all of these issues? I would argue the answer is yes, and the “common strand” is this: it is much harder, and more likely to be outright impossible, to make mechanisms that maintain desirable properties in a model where participants can collude, than in a model where they can’t.
Ignoring the impossible word (never judge the future ) this is a true statement. It is in line with its easier to stay warm when you ban cold
More seriously though, this is much like Byzantine failures being harder to manage than just errors or crashes (BFT verses CFT). Ofc byzantine is more difficult and we could say, or in the past many did, the Byzantine generals problem is “impossible” to solve or digital money is impossible, but then again we know it isn’t so hey ho.