The Cryptosphere

I just ran across this project so I don’t know that much about it save what’s on their site. It seems to have somewhat bad documentation. That is the documentation is extensive but seems to have been written from the point of view of the develooper and with the assumption the reader would know more about the project and be able to make certain logical and/or intuitive leaps about the project. I’m sorry folks but it’s not always obvious.

From what I could gather it’s another cryptonet like SAFE that combines data storage with monotary transaction. Though I’m not entirely sure how their payment system works, whether they use a PoW or PoR system or how exactly their data structure is set up at all. Can’t seem to make sense of their explainations at all.

Anyway here’s the site.

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Looks to be an abandoned project from Tony Arcieri who works at Square and sounds like a guy who would be enthused by Safe.


Encrypted peer-to-peer web application platform for decentralized, privacy-preserving applications

What makes the Cryptosphere different?

Many have sought to build an openly federated data storage system. Such a system was the basis for MojoNation, a startup which let you sell your storage and bandwidth for a virtual currency called Mojo. Unfortunately MojoNation never took off.

Freenet is the most similar system to the Cryptosphere today. Freenet provides strong guarantees on anonymity and seeks to provide a low barrier of entry for publishing content on the system.

The Cryptosphere strikes a balance between these two systems. Instead of using any sort of virtual currency like Mojo, peers barter with each other in exchanges which are completely localized to the peers involved. However, while every peer in a cryptographic exchange keeps extensive, cryptographically signed records of what was exchanged (or what they attempted to exchange), the specifics of what data was exchanged are not stored in the records, nor can they be derived from decrypting the content.

However, in a direct peer-to-peer exchange the Cryptosphere does nothing to mask the transactions a particular is performing, as opposed to systems like Freenet and Tor which make an effort to obscure which host you’re actually talking to by routing them through a chain of proxies. In this regard the anonymity guarantees of the Cryptosphere are no different from a system like BitTorrent, aside from the plausible deniability defense that comes from the fact all content is encrypted and peers automatically provide storage service to other peers.

Instead, the Cryptosphere favors system robustness over guarantees on anonymity. Participants in the system maintain a history of their activities in the form of a long-chain certificate. You can think of this being somewhat like the BitCoin block chain, where the longest version always wins, and its integrity can be cryptographically verified. Every peer maintains its own long chain certificate of all its activities, including services requested and services completed.

Rather than verifying the integrity of a long chain based on hashes, the Cryptosphere uses public key cryptography. Peers requesting services sign off on both the request and delivery of a service (e.g. storing and serving a particular chunk of a file). While in isolation the data points contained within a particular long chain certificate are meaningless, peers can collect several of these certificates and build a database of other peers in the system, using tools like collaborative filtering to make intelligent decisions about which other peers are worth interacting with.

The Incentive Problem

The Cryptosphere’s trust model attempts to incentivize participants who act in good faith by limiting the ability of greedy peers to abuse the network. Storage space and bandwidth are viewed as fungible commodities which come at a cost to the peer which is providing them, a commodity which must be reciprocated. Greedy peers want to consume these resources without contributing back to the network, ignoring the cost of the resources to those who provide it. There are two ways that greedy peers can abuse the system:

Storage: greedy peers will seek to fill the system with objects only they are interested in without contributing storage space in return
Bandwidth: greedy peers will consume content from the system without contributing bandwidth in return
The Cryptosphere prevents greed by encouraging reciprocity through a sort of bartering system: storage is traded for storage and bandwidth, and bandwidth is traded for bandwidth. Peers select the best trading partners based on their own self-interest and all available data, then engage in trades. Trades with newcomers are initially considered risky, but have the potential to grow into a fruitful relationship.

Storage is negotiated in units called “creds” which equate to storing a single byte for one day (86400 seconds). At the end of the day peers can determine if the exchange was mutually beneficial and decide to renegotiate it for another day. Peers will avoid renegotiating with other peers that did not faithfully provide a service. The goal is for peers to eventually form long-term, ongoing relationships of storing particular pieces of data to ensure it remains highly available.

By default the Cryptosphere software is tuned to be a somewhat altruistic risk taker in the interests of making the Cryptosphere as a whole a more useful and robust system. In the future it should be possible to tune the Cryptosphere to your needs as an individual peer, being as altruistic or stingy as you like. Altruistic peers will improve system robustness at the expense of being an easy target for greedy peers. Stingy peers will be difficult to trade with and will favor established members of the community with a good reputation among a large body of peers that the stingy peer knows directly.

How the Cryptosphere stores data

As you might expect from the name, everything within the Cryptosphere is encrypted using strong cryptography. The following cryptographic components are used to secure data in the system:

crypto_secretbox_xsalsa20poly1305: authenticated secret-key encryption of data blocks
blake2: hash-based key derivation, merkle trees for content identification
curvecp: transport encryption
Data is stored using a technique called convergent encryption. Convergent encryption means that when a file is encrypted, you will always get the same cryptographic result, allowing files to be deduplicated globally. This approach works by calculating a hash (specifically a Blake2 hash) of a file’s contents and using that to derive the key for an authenticated block cipher (specifically crypto_secretbox_xsalsa20poly1305).

The Cryptosphere identifies values by the hash of the encrypted contents, meaning to get the plaintext for a particular file you must know two hashes: the hash of the encrypted file (in order to ask the peer network to download the file) and the original hash of the file’s plaintext contents (in order to have the crypto_secretbox_xsalsa20poly1305 key to decrypt it)

Because of this, the act of transferring a file or parts of files from other peers does not mean you have access to the plaintext. This means that users of the software have plausible deniability that by transferring the ciphertext of the content they have access to the plaintext. The system by its very nature works to increase the redundancy of data within the system in a distributed manner, and content may be transferred to a particular user’s computer without the user of the software’s knowledge or consent.

This makes it difficult to prove that a particular user was deliberately trying to access any specific piece of content on the system. Unless you can prove they have the original hash of any file you cannot establish they even have access to the contents, only to the ciphertext, and therefore logs of specific IP addresses transferring encrypted data prove nothing as the software by design may transfer parts of files between peers at any time. You cannot prove the user elected to engage in the transfer, and even if you could, unless you can prove the encryption key needed to access a particular piece of content is present on a particular user’s computer (and that a particular person chose to obtain that encryption key) you cannot prove they actually voluntarily elected to acquire a particular piece of content.

Yeah okay so how do we get in touch with him to tell him the good news?

Looks like @ioptio follows him, so he’s probably aware already.

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