I see the discussion has shifted from the “could” to the “should”, which was probably the concern all along.
OK, SAFEnet should have strong “deniability” (i.e., unknowability on the part of the host of the origin of chunks) because if it doesn’t then it will be much less distinguishable from other distributed storage systems that will come into that market space. You’ve got to wonder why someone would argue strenuously for greylistability for SAFEnet instead of just joining IPFS or Storj.
It is not unlike the statement that bankers often come out with, that Bitcoin is impractical/undesirable but blockchain technology is wonderful, and how can they run it in a walled-garden, keeping their institutional structures the same. But Andreas Antonopoulos has plucked that canard featherless (look up his speech at a banker conference). The coin is the fuel of the system, payment to miners for keeping everyone honest, and the lack of central control, its feralness, has toughened it against the best attacks that can be thrown at it. Ungreylistability/unknowability* is as important for SAFEnet’s future as the lack of a control center is for Bitcoin.
Another analogy is the fungibility of money: It is a very good thing that it is infeasible for people know what the currency notes in their wallet were used for a few exchanges ago and that banknotes cannot (legally or practically) be earmarked as good or bad. Without that property, the money system would break down.
* More accurate terms than deniability, since deniability implies that the host might know the origin of chunks but can plausibly pretend not to know. Ungreylistability/unknowability means that it is infeasible for the host to find out the origin of chunks, and that relieves him of a great burden of concern and much complication.