RFC 0061 — Safe Network Token Distribution

The only real contribution I have to this besides putting out my preference for a zero decimal solution is that the total supply should still be kept at 2^32 (or some multiple of 10 thereof to move the decimal points) instead of expanded to accommodate the misprinting of additional tokens.

Perhaps I just never dug deep enough, but I was always of the understanding since I got here and read the papers that there would be a max of 2^32 tokens. The fact I find that my share of the tokens is now diminished because of a mistake in previous allocation should not be put on the long time supporters of the network. There’s little reason to expand the supply beyond the originally proposed 2^32 besides the misguided attempt at staunchly adhering to the original document of 10% of total supply being ICO’d.

The fact is, up until a year or two ago, the 2^32 was going to have to be strictly enforced, anyway, due to technical limitations of a 32-bit supply as it was originally conceived. Not sure why the max supply now has to change just because that limitation is no longer existing.

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Hi @krnelson sorry for not getting back.

I agree with this. It is very interesting, and could be useful, to think about a theoretical max growth rate, and the conditions necessary for it.

It also seems like it would be quite complicated to provably achieve (a certain degree of) the conditions. Nonetheless, could be useful to actually try wrap some heads around it.

Trying to form an understanding of optimal growth gives, I think, a good base mental setting when setting out to solve this problem. But not only that, the actual findings when exploring it, might inform further directions, paths and decisions.

Generally I think that is needed even more than what we’ve seen so far through the years, a more rigorous engineering approach. Like establishing the aims, the boundaries of the problem (all levels), and systematically walk through the options.

I hope that I can in some way contribute to this in the end being applied successfully to the process.

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The average price for SNT in the market is related to network demand and thus it’s growth rate at any particular time.

So as not to overly influence the growth rate, the simple option is to release reserve SNT-DBC’s slowly over a long period of time.

Rapid issuance could cause a surge in demand followed by a slump (a recession) - similar to the “business cycle” in modern economics caused by central bank interest rate manipulation.

As with a business cycle recession wherein businesses go out of business due to a contraction in the supply of money, the network would see the loss of farmers for the same reason.

Keeping the issuance rate constant and small is hence the best way to mitigate the manipulation of the market for data storage.

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Is anyone annoyed that the current RFC dilutes MSC holders?

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Does it. The difference between 2^32/10 and the slightly higher number is very small and if the market is aware of it, then is it really dilution.

Or is it the slight increase in total number of SNT?
But is it really. Rewards over a decade will be much higher than the total supply, it doesn’t work the same as other coins (or fiat) where “printing” more coins/notes dilutes the currency. Once the network launches then the reward rate and initial supply will be the determining factor of where the worth of SNT will go.

If reward rate is higher then that dilutes SNT compared to if reward rate is 1/4 of that.

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It does. Consider the violation of the 2^32 hardcap (which should never have been considered). A 1:1 conversion for a hardcap of 2^32 vs. 1:1 at the stated 4525524120 amounts to a 5.1% reduction in total network stake for every maid hodler.

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Accepting your calculation as correct that’s a narrow view. Maybe there are benefits to handling the excess this way compared to alternatives? I don’t argue that this is the case, I just make the point that focusing on dilution ignores other possible effects that might benefit holders which should also be explored and included in any discussion.

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It’s far simpler and easier to just keep the promise of a 2^32 hardcap and 1:1 exchange for maid holders. This is not an “alternative” it is in fact equivalent to the “original” plan. All other promises to shareholders and developers made in the original proposal can also be kept in a simple and straightforward manner following the same process without introducing many of the convoluted means described in this RFC. KISS.

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That can only occur if all SNT are issued to people and no significant amount held by the network nor foundation. Until then its a potential figure. The SNT is effectively an endless amount and only hoarding can get it to be fully issued or we are way in the future and by then noone will remember the one off dilution of 5%.

Also a one off 5% dilution is not really going to have long term effect when its introduced a long time before SNT even exists. Dilution is only going to be a practical issue if it suddenly occurs at launch and markets react badly.

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I thought these maid extras created in the IPO were controlled by maidsafe and were never sold to public.

If so, I think the correct thing to do would be to burn them and keep the hardcap at 2^32 to preserve the initial IPO conditions.

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Each company share of Maidsafe.net Limited will entitle the bearer to 111.5 SNT, resulting in shareholders being allocated 226,276,206 SNT.

Does this allocation refer to the SPV raise on bnktothefuture or the entirety of maidsafe company?

It is each shareholder, via btf or not.

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Correct me if my back of the envelope math is wrong but from what I see in that case is it’s roughly a 25% total return in GBP terms for those that bought equity in 2016. For those that used BTC to invest (probably most of us) it’s a loss of -97.5%

I’m curious why you arent deciding to reward early shareholders/project backers with significantly more tokens? Seems something very easy to fix. Current model doesn’t even beat inflation?

If I remember correctly that one share in the SPV is not one share in Maidsafe, or am I remembering incorrectly and there is an equivalent number of SPV shares as the number of shares that the SPV owns in maidsafe?

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do anything years ago, even buy toilet rolls

And it’s not an accurate way to look at anything.

I think this is the case at least the spv purchased those shares so they should belong to the buyrs of the spv shares.

I will always prefer an easy fix, but just giving stuff to people based on X is not an easy fix. What about ICO buyers, early equity holders, loan givers etc., which group gets more (so now in preferential shareholder territory (which is illegal)) and why?

The easy fix is to do the right thing. Realise folk invested and then increase their return by producing value (launch and get users etc.) and not by increasing prices via stories or increasing the number of tokens they hold (where do we get these from anyway).

I would hope whatever we, as a business and also us as a community, do, is a simple non-complex and very defendable action that even a 5-year-old could understand. I do not favour complex mechanisms to favour the few over the many.

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Thanks god, I just want to trade

I doubt it has even started yet in earnest. The social and disinformation attacks from those who have rushed competing projects that will probably die off with a safe functional network need a basis for creating competing narratives. The beautiful Safe Network community will go from entirely supportive (gestation) to eventually toxic (birth–> adolescence). Then state & corp attacks. This is an adversarial undertaking, it is to be expected. We’ve seen the same thing on BTC.

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I finally got through all the discussions here. I have several thoughts/suggestions:

First, I strongly dislike having the Foundation be the custodian of the 70% of the SNT supply.

Second, I also strongly dislike giving the entire genesis SNT to MAID/eMAID/MaidSafe investors. Not because I think it would affect the functioning of the network, but because it would affect the public’s perception of the project and it would be more difficult to onboard potential new users of the network. The incentive for many of the folk that may get involved with the network in its early days after launch will likely be speculation. Speculators play an important role in the ecosystem, as I’m sure nearly all of you recognize, having invested in this project. Setting up incentives for successive rounds of speculators to get involved with the project going forward, and for the new users that that will bring, is important imo.

Allow me to analogize to bitcoin. The bitcoin “narrative” was strengthened by its distribution model. Those who got involved in the early days knew that their bitcoins would be diluted, but that there would come a time when no new bitcoins would be created (and indeed some would be lost from time to time by mismanagement of keys, making the post-block reward era deflationary). That (among other things) gave investors the feeling of being early. If instead, all 21 million bitcoins were minted to Satoshi Nakomoto and friends at the genesis of the network, that same narrative would not have been present. There would have been nothing to look forward to from an investment perspective from the supply-side. Moreover, buying from Satoshi Nakamoto and friends would be scary given how much centralized control of the supply they would have and their ability to, therefore, cause a sell-off.

The only idea for a solution to this conundrum that I saw was @TylerAbeoJordan 's DAO proposal. But I would tweak his suggestion of a proof of work mechanism for releasing the SNT a bit. Why not have the DAO submit small payments periodically to all of the elders/adults in each section? So a node’s reward could come from two sources, the “inflationary fees” from the DAO and the Resource Supply Rewards. The DAO could also manage the SNT allocated to the Network Royalties Pool, which may help ameliorate some of the concerns I’ve been reading (which I share) about the size and control of those funds. Proposals for development funding could be voted on, and the funds distributed, without any third party through the DAO.

It may be desirable, however, for the Foundation to have control of the core development fund. I recognize that the current thinking does not separate the 15% development fund into a core development fund and a separate development fund for developers on the network. However, that may worth revisiting if the DAO idea gains traction. I have not fully thought through the pros and cons of the Foundation having control of a core development fund, but it just seems that that piece cannot or should not be made autonomous in a DAO. Please let me know your thoughts.

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Also, I fully support @jlpell 's proposed solution to the hard cap issue here:

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It’s looking like they’ve a solution for the network holding and issuing the reserve tokens now - so not held by foundation or given to existing maid holders. We will see what happens.

Read the weekly updates to keep track of what’s going on. :wink:

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