MaidSafe Channels Solution to Big Threats and Centralization

Think of an entity with nearly unlimited computational resources like
the NSA/govts across the world-- if the main network gets attacked and corrupted at any time by
data centers with billions of VMs pretending to be individual nodes
with average network specs, or engineering the average specs-- remaining online for a year or two, gaining
reputation, then shutting them off, could a large amount of the data be
disappeared? I think that adding in a channel feature in the MaidSafe
network might be a good idea, but it will start fresh – say a 32-byte
identifier with the default being all 0s for the original MaidSafe
network-- and ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ01245 (or other string) could be a different
MaidSafe network with it’s own currency, etc-- allowing people to 'fork’
their own by setting identifiers if the main one gets corrupted.

I recognize this kind of conflicts with the current business model for MaidSafe-- but it’s important to recognize possible threats.

It is technologically feasible to have automated deployment of such. I.e. autoVM creator with control scripts deployed in many places across the earth – then when the network launches firing up the nodes with appropriate bandwidth/space/CPU power. Not only would possibly lots of data be inaccessible, but if shut off all at the same time, it would flood the network with requests for the missing chunks to be dealt with. It may not be feasible to get sufficient bandwidth for all the newly created VMs, even with OC-1536, etc. Just saying that there could be a collaboration between intelligence agencies to do something like this.

Kinda surprised that nobody responded to this yet.

My guess would be that after an early adoption phase, this kind of attack would be insanely expensive to carry out - You would have to get large amounts of consecutive servers in the random address space, and you would have no control of choosing your addresses. The more resources you provide the cheaper the network would be to use, and the more machines would join – causing getting the consecutive network addresses to be harder and harder to get and maintain.

It is very hard to invest massive amounts of money into something just to try to destroy it…

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So when the project leader said XOR distance, he was talking about IP addresses, not MaidSafe addresses?

This attack is theoretically possible. You can do two things to make it harder to pull off. Increase the 20% targeted free storage percentage, and/or increase the amount of copies that are maintained by the network. I’m not sure if either is necessary. I think in the early stages of the network, the network is too insignificant to spend much resources on an attack like this. In the later days, when the network’s insane success may be seen as a threat to the world’s status quo, the attack will be extremely costly and quite damaging to the world’s economy.

Granted, not every attacker may care about the latter, but an alliance between potential state-backed attackers would be less likely. Anyway, I think there are easier ways to attack MaidSafe, like bans, propaganda, and exploiting bugs.

What, why? No.

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No, IP addresses are known only between the client PC and the first hop (nodes acting as client managers). Everything on the network has a 512 bit address (different 512 bit address space for different node roles, data locations etc.)

Within an address space (one of those 512 bit integers), the distance between nodes is measured purely as the XOR distance between their 512 bit addresses.

Here is one explanation of XOR distance and why it is used, there are others so if this one isn’t helping ask and someone will help!
Shortest distance between two points is not always a straight line