Hey, is safe to receive and send on same adress multiple times?
If we are comparing to blockchain, then there is no public ledger that could be used to tie things together and form a trail, if that is you security concern. Only the sender and recipient have knowledge of the transaction.
If you decided to send things with the same identity, and the recipients were to give bad actors the transaction details, then all the obvious security concerns would apply.
However, with the Safe Network, you can have multiple identities (as many as you want in fact) and also choose to send payments anonymously too, should you need to. Although that is overkill for most people, but everybody’s threat model differs, so you can suit it to your needs.
Does a transaction reveal the owning Safe ID? Or it possible to create DBC “check” that doesn’t reveal anything about the source of funds?
Well, we are in a little bit of a transition phase to the DBC payment system—the terminology is in a bit of flux especially—but just as in the previous designs, it will only reveal the previous owners identify if they choose to reveal it… which will of course by very useful and typical in most circumstances, but for people who require it, there will be the option to transact anonymously.
The roots to that appear numerous; either through one-time addresses, one time SafeID, or as you hint at and there are also designs for ownerless DBCs. But I’ll let others in the team comment on the latest progress in that area, and how exactly that might function, as it’s not finalised.
No need to distract others, happy to wait until this is determined. Thanks Jim.
Are you talking about MAID or Safe Network Tokens?
Dne čt 27. kvě 2021 1:23 uživatel drehb via Safe Network Forum <firstname.lastname@example.org> napsal:
Define unsafe. The token is transmitted as metadata on Bitcoin. You can receive unlimited times to the same address without changing the safety profile. The public key for a fresh address is protected by ripeMD160(SHA-2(public key)). It is permanently revealed on the first spend.
So what’s the threat model? If you can’t reverse SHA2 and RipeMD160 then you can’t even get the public key (and there is some evidence that SHA2 is not reversible). If you’ve spent from the address, then you have to rely on elliptic curve cryptography, which is pretty damn secure. Every message you send exponentially multiplies the attack vectors, but it is still nation-state type of thing to even contemplate how to attack it.
TLDR: a never spent from address is likely unattackable without rubber-hose vectors. Unlimited receives. After the first spend, you are into an increasing risk zone, but realistically probably completely fine.