I have to say, I’ve not seen agreement on this one. There’s a lot of voices on either side (and I myself am for this to be a network level feature with then optional ‘tipping’ as an app).
It costs nothing for this to be implemented in the network and creates a base reward level and an increase in SAFE circulation. Even if it’s not enough for creators to survive on, it’s a good basis and a level for a tipping app to go off. (Pay creators at 1.5x network level).
Let me get this straight then, firstly who’s paying for this? If it’s the farmers, then why are the farmers subsidising business? Doesn’t sound like a better way of doing things - just the same old way of doing things in society. As you said:
The farmers are not.
Its part of the PUT costs. A small percentage of the PUT costs will be paying for various parts of the network functioning. Such as Messaging, Proposed PtP, All the Various Node’s operations, etc in addition to Data Storage.
The Output coins are to the Farmers at a network determined rate, and proposed PtP. Proposed PtP rate is network determined and does not reduce farming rate in any way.
Also the proposed PtP is designed to help (in a partial way) artists to shed the business model of “Agents & media fat cats”
I see…sort of… 
I’m obviously confused somewhere, but I’m reading your reply as
I’ve probably mixed something up - this happens with techie stuff, this is just the nub of my questioning…farmers provide the space to store data, so get rewarded by Network…I’m not getting why “messaging apps” etc need rewarding?
Nope it is as i Wrote
the farmers are paid coin for providing storage, bandwidth, cpu to run the vaults.
The network Does many things other than storing data and the Put costs pay for those. If PtP is introduced as David proposed then Put costs will also eventually include a small percentage that goes to cover those costs.
I am looking at payments/receipts the way the network does. It receives payment. In its “black box” it does many functions for which there is only one payment, that is PUT costs. Then looked at the outputs which is payment for farming and if introduced payment for PtP incentives.
Just trying to point out that when people pay for PUTs they are paying the network, not people. And when people provide vault resources they are paid by the network at a rate determined by the network. & potentially for providing public content that people will be drawn to. Its not you directly paying for farmers.
In essence the network pays out of its reserve in coins, if coins become scarce then payments are less often. And when people PUT data the network receives coins which it recycles back into its reserve. The counter factor is that wehn coin is scarce then the $$ value of each coin will be expected to rise due to scarcity.
Neo, could you explain how in your opinion taking a “small percentage” (really doesn’t matter whether it’s small or big) from the PUT cost is not the same as taking money from what the farmers can effectively receive? That doesn’t make any sense to me economically. There is only one PUT amount and if it’s distributed to farmers AND content providers/app creators then the cut of farmers is lower no matter how often people say its not taken from the farmer’s reward.
If a reward is “added” to the “regular” farmer reward then price of space on SAFE goes up (lower value of SAFEcoin per Gb), while farmers still receive the same amount as they receive without the additional cost - their reward then is relatively lower. This way farmers subsidize content creators. What part do I miss?
If you attempt to see it as a 1:1 input → output (time wise) then of course what you say would be the case. Really it is a lot more complex than that. Of course in the greater scheme of things over the life of SAFE the farmers would as a collective receive less actual coin if PtP is implemented. But when looking at it in a period of time then the network is not adjusting the farming rate because of the PtP outputs.
When you consider that the system is more
then you see that only when the coin becomes relatively scarce that the farmers are getting less in the lottery (a small %age) but the network is still calculating the farming rate the same. But at that time the farmers are expected to be getting the same $$ rate because scarce coin is expected to be worth more $$ each.
In effect the farmers may never see any reduction $$ wise collectively depending on how the scarcity affects the $$ rate.
Basically the coin becomes scarcer at a marginally earlier time, but the $$ value is expected to increase as scarcity occurs. Of course if the expected behaviour due to scarcity does not occur then some of the basic premises explained by David did not occur.
These points are in contradiction to one another. You can’t argue that people give away their content for free on one hand, then assert that it will collapse if people aren’t paid.
I am sure paying for content will cause more people to consider creating it. Whether anyone would pay more to use a network which socialised these costs in debatable and puts the whole project at risk.
However, providing a more frictionless way to pay content creators may help. This is what I am backing.
You cannot simply argue with the undistributed systemic Safecoins - those will be delivered in ~20 years, you need to take the global picture into account. If you look at the network macroeconomically, you have to take into account its foundations, that is: PUT cost = farmer reward + uploader/app reward.
People confuse the role of farmers and uploaders/apps. Farmers contribute to the maintenance of the network, uploaders/apps contribute to useability. Those are two different kinds of work and they have to be evaluated and rewarded differently.
It’s feasible that ptp will encourage more PUTS, therefore more money coming in for the farmers so they could/would earn more in fact.
Arguably, farmers will only be able to charge what the market can bare, relative to their operating costs. Competition will see to this.
Therefore, the content reward would have to be on top of this. That is, farmers will charge as much as they can regardless - whether PUTs cost more to cover content or not will not affect farming rates.
However, if the PUT cost then becomes too high, people won’t pay it. The network would become too expensive for users, due to the subsidies for content creators. This would make the whole project economically unviable, when there are cheaper (equivalent) alternatives (which would include safe net forks, ofc).
Since PtP necessitates higher PUT prices, basic economic reasoning suggests it will actually lead to fewer PUTs. The extra cost is a certainty, the required level of popularity to earn that back (and then some, hopefully) is not.
By such mechanisms as giving it to app makers? Let’s put it another way, “Who’s end does the reward come from?” Where would the “reward” otherwise go? If not paying apps or content creation at Network level - where would that money go?
To do that you have to understand that PUTs pay into the “reserve of coin”, the unallocated coin.
The receivers receive from the “reserve of coin”
To ensure the well being of the system the PUT costs have to adjust according to many factors including the available spare capacity of the network, ETC. To blindly pay big amounts to output without the PUTs being reasonably able to cover these long term is to destroy the economy. But it cannot do the instantaneous balancing of input=outputs. WHY? Because the rate of gets to puts will not always be able to balance that equation, but long term it does. That is why the reserve of unallocated coin is so important. Also this allows apparent imbalance in that input == output. (NOTE: more outputs is expected to see an increase in inputs later on)
If you also do not look at the code for calculating the payments in/out you miss an important aspect and that is scarcity occurs when a significant amount of coin is used up. This can (note I don’t say does) allow for output payment rates (attempts) to be greater than recovery of coin because the rates produce attempts to receiving a coin, but if the coin at the address the attempt specified is already allocated then no coin can be given. So scarcity occurs, scarcity means greater $$ value, so the actual rate of receiving coin may drop earlier, but the value of the coins is higher. It is possible that the actually $$ value may rise faster then the scarcity does.
In actuality it is possible (I said possible not that it does) for the network to pay APPs without receiving anything extra in PUTs costs. Same for PtP. That would mean coin scarcity occurs earlier and $$ goes up faster. Only if the coins were hoarded would it be a problem for the network. No hoarding means all coins out are returned, hoarding slows down that returning.
Remember that scarcity will occur from the start. More than 10% of the coins are allocated and so it is expect that 1 in 10 GETs which succeed in the farming rate calculation for farming will result in the coin already being allocated and the coin is not given (cannot double give a coin). When 20% of coin is allocated then 2 in 10 fail at getting a coin.
NOTE Farming rate determines the # GETs for a farming attempt. The # coins allocated determine the chance of a coin being available at the address given from the farming attempt. It is this that allows the apparent imbalance between PUT costs and Farming rate+app rate+PtP rate.
Rewards are paid by the network.
The network is paid by the PUTters
When coin is scarce the outputs slow down even though the attempts to pay may remain fairly consistent.
More output means more inputs (after a delay in time)
Since considering the buffering effect and the effect scarcity has on both coin issuance per attempt and the $$ value, I am wondering just how much PUT prices have to be adjusted for the long term stability. (see my posts above.)
The fact that farming rate can be the same yet the amount of previously supplied coin affects the coin issuance rate will account for the apparent imbalance of not charging extra.
Also consider that coin issued for PtP & APPs will find their way back into the network (PUTs) also mean that any coin issued for PtP (or APP) is paid into the network. (permanently hoarded coin is useless to owner & network)
So the only choice here is whether to pay content/apps at the Network level or not essentially still. There appears to be no convincing reason to do so still, as far as I can see.- I think I get the argument about preventing “aggregators” but think it raises more problems than it solves :I think it would necessitate a category of “Safe apps” - which would require further human resources and raises further issues I think - in order to achieve what in any case?.If it’s to stimulate “the economy” and Network adoption, then I get the reasoning.
However I would suggest this would only be necessary during the initial inflationary period of the Network’s “Big Bang”. As only for a temporary period, then if decide to go ahead, can a pot of money not just be set aside for this purpose, rather than coding things in at Network level? 
Work-In-Progress
Lets take the extreme situation of PUTs only covering the GET payments and not the APPs or PtP and all content is public with PtP (no APPs but follows same logic) NOTE: days and farming/PtP rates are illustrative not following a set pattern. I cannot fit in the coin being paid into the network but it is the total coin given with some delays
edit: coin-rate is rate * (1 - allocated-coin-%) to reflect the failed coin issuance due to the coin already allocated on issuance attempt.
Day coin ------Farming------- -------PtP--------
issued Rate Coin-Rate Rate Coin-Rate
1 10% 0.5 0.45 0.05 0.045
200 20% 0.4 0.32 0.045 0.036
300 30% 0.45 0.315 0.045 0.0315
500 40% 0.6 0.36 0.06 0.036
.....
???? 70% 0.6 0.18 0.05 0.015
???? 80% 0.25 0.05 0.02 0.004
???? 90% 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.001
And all the issued coin is being recycled, but after some delay from issuance. There will be some hoarded coin which explains why the coin becomes more allocated and the delay to being used also causes higher allocation. As the coin becomes more scarce the $$ value goes up and even though farmers get less coin, the $$ value remains more even.
In there is nothing requiring PUT cost to be any specified cost.
But in either case the reason for the PUT cost is not to cover the OUTPUTs but to control the rate of coin allocation.
The markets decide the $$ value of the coin from the scarcity of getting the coin.
thank you for your comments @neo
after all these debates am i wrong drawing the following conclusion: farmers bring into the network more than they hope to get out of the network, and the only ones who would profit from safecoin->fiat exchange are the app developers (content creators)?
which leads me to another question: does the ‘farmer’ really exist as a job in the ecosystem, since his work revenue is always smaller than the value he brings in?
I think you will find that the calculations for farming rate is (&will be) designed to mean that the “home” farmer will receive more than his costs. The design is for the farmer to receive higher income than the value brought in.
The network is factored for the home farmer who provides spare storage capacity (or very cheap storage)
Of course if the $$ value in the “exchanges” does not reflect this then the farmer needs to hold his coins until he gets a better price, or use his coins to PUT data. The PUT costs is expected to be worth the farmers while.
Its the PtP rewards that for some will not be enough and for others who add other content to supplement their art it will be helpful (assuming its popular)